THE FUTURE OF JOINT LOGISTICS: A PROPOSAL FOR ACHIEVING TRUE JOINT LOGISTICS WITHIN THE AMERICAN MILITARY
Stovepipes, gaps, and seams between and among Services, multi-agency, and multinational partners have yielded myriad incompatible force projection and sustainment systems and hurdles to sharing information and support with one another. Should there be one global logistics command? Although there is some recent progress on the joint logistics front, issues such as service culture, partisan politics, resources, and existing law continue to encumber the process. A review of recently published doctrine and policy provides the desired characteristics and capabilities of a transformed joint force, but does not provide a comprehensive joint logistics structure nor explain how the logistics systems will transform.
These hard calls must be resolved if the United States is to achieve the level of transformation This paper examines the future of joint logistics. It details the need for joint logistics and links these needs to current joint logistics initiatives. The paper discusses five possible options for implementation of joint logistics organizational transformation and provides an analysis of each course of action. It concludes with a recommended course of action for strategic planning.
The objective is to provide a realistic, clear, and concise roadmap for achieving joint logistics within the overall logistics transformation initiative.
The Need for Joint Logistics
Joint Logistics: The art and science of planning and carrying out, by a joint force commander and staff, logistic operations to support the protection, movement, maneuver, firepower, and sustainment of operating forces of two or more military departments of the same nation. Operation Iraqi Freedom also provides evidence of problems stemming from a lack of joint logistics. A recent Government Accountability Office report describes backlogs of hundreds of pallets at aerial and sea ports, inadequate in-transit visibility, and duplication of requisitions due to lack of trust in the supply system as major issues in Iraq. The report describes "substantial logistics problems" experienced by the services, which ultimately resulted in actions such as cannibalization of vehicles due to repair parts shortages.
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Transformation to an integrated joint logistics capability would address problems such as these and resolve the lack of centralized logistics oversight and management that exists at the operational and theater levels. context. Forces must increase agility, reduce profile within an operating area, and synchronize capabilities. 9 Transformational concepts to achieve these traits include elimination of logistics stove piping, broadening the logistics resource base among services, and networking of resources and assets.
10
The National Security Strategy provides the requirement to transform all security institutions. 11 This strategy identifies the need to change the defense establishment into one that is postured for continuous transformation. 12 A key goal of the strategy is development of the capability to rapidly deploy forces from strategic distances, and to sustain joint or combined combat forces. 13 Logistically, the military must be able to operate in an environment where the enemy or political situation limits access to air and sea ports of debarkation. There will be neither time nor resources available to build an extensive logistics base in the joint operational area.
National strategic guidance from the President The Joint Operations Concepts calls for a shift from supply-based logistics and servicecentric planning to a structure that is precise, flexible, and responds to a joint commander's needs. 16 It envisions a globally networked logistics system that is synchronized and fully integrated across the services and at all levels. To achieve desired capabilities the joint force's functions must be fully integrated, it must be rapidly deployable and sustainable, and it must be networked (linked in time and purpose). Additional characteristics include decentralization, decision superiority, adaptability, and lethality. 17 Clearly, the current system of each service and its components conducting individual planning and execution of logistics is discordant with this vision for future joint operations.
The Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept delineates the required capabilities for joint logistics support. These capabilities include joint and rapid distribution of the entire force, agile sustainment of the force, multinational logistics, information fusion, operational engineering, force health protection, and joint theater logistics management. 18 This concept envisions that only minimal essential functions will be performed in the theater or operational area, there will be smaller stockpiles for support, and that the joint force commander will have the ability to track, shift, and reconfigure sustainment and support even while on the move. 19 In order to meet the needs of the joint commander, logistics forces must operate with the smallest logistics footprint possible while providing continuous sustainment.
There is widespread agreement that future operations will be joint in nature, and will ideally involve coalition or alliance forces. Additionally, personnel from departments and agencies other than Department of Defense deploy to support military operations. The joint force commander must have a logistics structure that captures requirements from across this diverse group. The structure must effectively meet all of these needs without logistics shortfalls, but also without huge stockpiles of material within the operational area. Historic evidence reinforces the need to eliminate seams between organizations and between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. To make this possible, joint force commanders require a single process owner for the movement, storage, and delivery of supplies.
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The military's logistics systems and processes must transform to achieve true agility. The logistics system in-place today was inherited from the Cold War. The system supported the AirLand Battle doctrine, but does not adequately support joint and combined operations in a netcentric environment. It is capable of moving iron mountains, but it is not agile. 21 The Office of Transformation within the Department of Defense realizes the importance of joint operational logistics and states, "Logistics, then, is key to arranging the operations of campaigns and should be planned and executed as a joint responsibility." 22 The services understand that transformation is required; however, the Department of Defense has not produced a comprehensive plan that addresses the specific design of a comprehensive joint logistics structure. The Department has started some initiatives at the strategic level, but it is unclear how or if these initiatives will tie into a joint logistics organization at the operational or tactical levels. In order to synchronize transformation efforts across the services the Department of Defense needs to determine the specific concepts of joint logistics support and prescribe any organizational changes necessary to implement these concepts. The logistics transformation initiatives of these countries have several things in common.
They centralize procurement and management of equipment and materiel; they look for significant resource savings through elimination of redundant capabilities; and they aim to improve effectiveness at the tactical level. 25 All of these require significant organizational change, resulting in resistance to change which strategic leaders have to plan for and deal with.
The establishment of a single overarching logistics command creates de facto the need for a single common logistics data system. Most of the countries mentioned above instituted or are exploring a Joint Logistics Command, responsible for all strategic, operational, and tactical level logistics. 26 In terms of force size and complexity, however, none of these countries match that of the United States. Russia is the only nation that comes close; however service resistance to change is delaying Russia's logistics transformation. Focused Logistics is the strategic concept that defines broad logistics capabilities. 27 It is the capability of providing the right materiel and personnel at the right time and place to support operational objectives. This is achieved through improved information systems, changes in organizational structures, reengineered processes, and advances in technology. 28 Focused
Logistics provides the framework of desired capabilities, but does not specify how the Department of Defense or the military services will attain these capabilities. operational, and tactical levels, and on how to achieve the capabilities listed in the operating and functional concepts. The most urgent decision is that of determining the organizational structure and concepts for providing joint logistics at strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
All other decisions fall out of this issue.
Courses of Action
Five proposed courses of action provide the organizational structure needed to transform the Department of Defense and the military services to achieve an effective joint logistics capability. These courses of action require different levels of resources to implement. Each course of action will encounter different levels of organizational resistance to change; the largest changes will result in the greatest levels of resistance, thus reducing the odds of successful implementation. 38 Considering all the options, there is no benefit without cost. Efficiency is not a primary factor, but it is a secondary consideration when faced with the reality of scarce resources.
Finally, support for the on-going war effort and the vast size and complexity of America's armed forces must be taken into account in any analysis.
Recommendations
The American military needs a joint logistics capability. Despite a decade of recognized need, there still remains a vast gap between desired and actual joint logistical execution.
Studies and experience provide a foundation for strategy and doctrine. This is the time for the Department of Defense to decide what logistics organizational changes are needed, and then direct enforceable implementation of the changes to achieve the right organizations and the right systems that enable joint logistics.
Course of action two provides the best means to achieve the desired joint logistics Tactical level logistics remains unchanged with the exception of modifying systems and procedures to facilitate asset visibility, and the service component level would be required to respond to any tasking for support from the Joint Theater Support Command.
Conclusion
As America's military transforms, the logistics support structure must transform as well.
After almost ten years of discussion it is time to make the required changes. Strategic leaders need to make the hard decisions on what organizational changes are required and then direct these changes, while providing sufficient resources to make the change a success. Changes are needed to organizations, systems, and processes to enable joint logistics. 4 General Arnold reported that the lack of logistics planning by the Navy and failure to appreciate the scale of support required was leading to operational pauses in the campaign. with their logistic services. As of July 2005, the problem continued with Izvestia reporting that the logistics services will unite, saving six trillion rubles; but with the focus on abolishing duplicating structures, the military has yet to create the joint logistics service. A high-ranking officer summarized the situation as "The security ministries do not want to unite. There are too many personal interests. The problem could be solved if the control over funds was centralized." Russia clearly has a goal in mind, but must overcome service resistance to organizational change to make the goal a reality. The United Kingdom is implementing the Defense Logistics Transformation Program. The goal of this program is to incorporate all logistics transformation activities across British defense, from the forward area during operations, within the defense industry, to equipment acquisition. This on-going program has the goal of improving effectiveness on the front-line while meeting financial targets set by the central government. 
